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Abstract 
 
 
 
 
From Upper Volta to Burkina Faso, is the study of the politics of reaction and reform in a 
post-colonial nation-state of Burkina Faso. Since its independence from France on 5 August 
1960 to 15 October 1987, Burkina Faso, the “land of the upright” people, has experience five 
changes in government. All of the coups that took place in this twenty-seven year period were 
reactionary and reforming. However, the most memorable reforms arrived after the coup of 4 
August 1983 which gave rise to a youthful president in a thirty-three year old Captain Thomas 
Sankara. As the leaders before him, Sankara reacted against a post-colonial government that he 
and supporters saw as inadequate. Unlike the previous coups in the Upper Volta, this work 
argues that the 4 August 1983 coup brought class consciousness to the forefront. It aimed to 
establish its identity by changing the country’s name from the colonial name of Upper Volta to 
Burkina Faso. The revolutionaries appeared to be genuine in meeting their words with action by 
working to create self-sufficient citizens, curb environmental depredation, combat corruption in 
government and provide women more opportunities. Though the Revolution in Burkina Faso 
(1983-1987) did not end the country’s ambitions for a multi-party democracy, it did elevate the 
status of women, literacy, mortality and pride for the homeland. 
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Introduction 
 
 
 
 
Burkina Faso is a landlocked country located in the middle of West Africa. In 
 
1984 revolutionaries decided to rename the former French colony of Upper Volta, 
 
‘Burkina Faso.’ Burkina Faso is a name drawn from two of the most influential languages 
spoken in the country. Ethnic Mossi speak Moré and Fula is spoken by the Fulani (Fulani 
are called Peul(s) in French). Since 1984, the people of the country have called 
themselves ‘Burkinabé.’ The suffix ‘bé’ in the name ‘Burkinabé’ is a Fula term used to 
define an “inhabitant” in the language spoken by ethnic Peuls. The word 'Burkina,' in 
Moré, the most dominant ethnic language spoken there means “integrity” while ‘Faso’ in 
Fula means “land.” Mossi and Fulani are the most prevalent ethnic groups in this country, 
but they share the land with many other ethnicities such as the Lobe, Gourounsi, Yarse, 
Samo, Dogon, and Mande.
1
 
 
Between its independence on 5 August 1960 and 4 August 1983, Upper Volta 
experienced six changes in its government. In the course of twenty-three years, the 
government oscillated between civilian, military, capitalist and socialist ideological 
frameworks of rule. Yet, from 1983 to 1987, the military that controlled the government 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
On the Moré (Mossi) and Djoula (Fulani) linguistic translations of ‘Burkina Faso’, see Pierre Englebert, 
Burkina Faso: Unsteady Statehood in West Africa (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1996), 1, 58. 
2   
declared a ‘revolution’ aimed to transform the country. The revolutionary government 
promised to provide services for and share power with all the people.
2
 
On the evening of 4 August 1983, revolution reached the Upper Volta in the form 
of a military council headed by Captain Thomas Isidore Noël Sankara and three young 
junior officers in the parachute division of the national military. In Upper Volta, at that 
time, any commissioned or non-commissioned officer in any divisions of the national 
army holding any rank below ‘Colonel’ was considered a junior officer. Therefore, 
Majors, Captains, and Lieutenants constituted officers of the lower rank and file in 
Burkina Faso’s military in the 1980’s.  Captains Thomas Sankara and Blasé Compaoré, 
Henry Zongo and Major Jean-Baptiste Boukary Lingani constituted the core of the 
Organization Militaire Révolutionnaire (OMR-Revolutionary Military Organization) that 
took power in August 1983.
3
 
 
This research work operates from the premise of seeing revolutions in newly 
independent nations not as disruptions of legitimate rule following colonialism but 
political movements that considered and advanced alternative approaches to 
development. Alternative approaches to development are defined here (as in Upper 
Volta’s case) as development-oriented governments under the control of charismatic and 
non-traditional rulers (in this case, neither local Mossi nor foreign ‘Frenchmen’). Non- 
traditional government addresses development problems with “local” solutions as 
opposed to overlooking them or allowing foreign forces to set the terms for development 
regardless of the means by which it acquired power. This work acknowledges that any 
 
2 
Pearl T. Robinson, “Grassroots Legitimation of Military Governance in Burkina Faso and Niger: The 
Core Contradictions,” in Goran Hydén and Michael Bratton. Governance and Politics in Africa. (Boulder, 
CO: Lynne Rienner, 1992), 146. 
 
3 
Victor T. Le Vine, Politics in Francophone Africa (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2004), 146. 
3  
government that addresses poverty, health and women’s rights issues on its own terms is 
a legitimate government. This work argues that Thomas Sankara’s revolutionary 
government offered Burkina Faso a legitimate and alternative approach to development 
that was effective in identifying and addressing the issues that faced the country. 
The revolution required unity from the country’s populations to end political 
factionalism. Sankara’s efforts as president suggest that he recognized that power comes 
not from outsiders like France and Cote D’Ivoire and the local politicians these foreign 
countries supported, but rather Burkina’s local army and civilian populations. This work 
looks at the territory and colony of Upper Volta, and the political developments that led 
to independence from France. Chapter two looks at how the history of ethnic factionalism 
in the independent country led to conflicts for power.  Chapter three looks at the 4 August 
1983 military coup by assessing three of the major actions that revolutionaries took to 
transform the nation. The conclusion assesses the legacies of the revolution. 
The Revolutionary Military Organization’s (OMR) origin is shrouded in mystery. 
It is still unclear whether it was secretly formed by Sankara and other radical soldiers 
years before the coup or after the seizure of the national radio station on that 4 August 
night. The ideologically radical OMR shared power with two outstanding civilian leftist 
organizations, namely the Ligue Patriotique pour le Développement (Lipad-Patriotic 
League for African Development) and the Union des Luttes Communistes (ULC-Union of 
the Communist Struggle).
4   
On the first year anniversary of the Revolution (August 
 
1984), the leaders changed the country’s name to ‘Burkina Faso’ in an attempt to move 
the country beyond its colonial experience. The efforts to transform the administration to 
 
 
 
4 
Pierre Englebert, Burkina Faso, 55-56. 
4  
protect the environment and women’s rights by the revolutionary military regime 
generated mixed reactions from the people in the country. 
Published works in English on the Burkinabe Revolution present challenges for 
anyone seeking to understand and place that revolution in context. One reason for this is 
that Burkina Faso had limited external relations with English speaking countries in West 
Africa. Thus, French remained as the language of government. Therefore, there is limited 
number of the historical accounts of the revolution in English. Nevertheless, the few 
published English sources on the Revolution, along with available translations of 
speeches and official documents of the revolutionaries, offer enough information to 
permit an assessment of what took place in Burkina Faso from 1960 to 1987. Of the few 
English-speaking scholars who have written about the country, fewer than twenty have 
developed substantial analysis of the origins, leaders, initial successes and the later 
setbacks of the Burkinabé revolution. 
The first published work, an eighteen page article in English on the Burkinabé 
 
Revolution, appeared in the 32nd Edition of the Review of African Political Economy.  In 
 
1985, Victoria Brittain published interviews of CNR members in her “Introduction to 
Sankara & Burkina Faso.” The article recounts the recent political history of the Upper 
Volta under Major Jean Baptiste Ouedraogo’s Conseil de Salut du Peuple (CSP I and 
CSP II -Council(s) of Salvation in People) regime and offers a biographical study of 
Sankara along with an analysis of his first two years as president of Burkina Faso. 
In her article, Brittain argues that the August Revolution of 1983 in the Upper 
Volta served two purposes. First, it was a reaction to the failures of the CSP government 
to deliver on its political promises of power sharing with a youthful ideological left. 
5  
Second, it was to liberate the civilians from the historical economic inequalities prolonged 
by ethnic politics and the plunder of the country’s resources.  For her, the “ten years” 
leading up to the August 1983 revolution were characterized by “clandestine political 
work” and military coups. Quite simply, civilian politics operated in the shadows of 
martial law since January 1966. The military assumed the roles of not just defenders of the 
nation, but also its legislators or policy makers. 
In 1980, President Colonel Saye Zerbo issued decrees that put junior-rank soldiers 
in political positions usually reserved for civilians. According to Brittain, these measures 
were partly responsible for enabling the young socialist and communists soldiers to 
greatly influence the nation’s politics that led to the fourth intervention of the military in 
national politics in August 1983.
5   
Thus, as Brittain observes, the revolution did not occur 
 
over night. Instead, for years, the previous military regimes appointed junior-ranked 
soldiers to power positions.  Perhaps the most striking example was Thomas Sankara’s 
appointment to Secretary of State under Colonel Saye Zerbo’s military regime from 1980 
to 1981. 
In recounting the events which occurred during the revolution, Victoria Brittain 
places less emphasis on Sankara’s leadership of the revolution than on the political 
upheavals between civilian revolutionary and anti-revolutionary political parties that 
supported or opposed the CNR military regime. She acknowledges the two main groups 
that fought for and against CNR leadership. The Ligue Patriotique pour le 
Développement (Lipad-Patriotic League for Development) supported the radical 
government and the Syndicate National de Enseigneurs Africain de la Hauté Volta 
 
 
5 
Victoria Brittain, “Introduction to Sankara & Burkina Faso," Review of African Political Economy 12.32 
(1985): 39-47. 
6  
(SNEAHV-National Union of African Teachers of the Upper Volta), a rightist teachers 
union, opposed the CNR’s move to power. According to Brittain, not only was there 
“political infighting” between Lipad and SNEAHV, Lipad found itself at odds with the 
ULC (Union of Communist Struggles party), and the OMR (Revolutionary Military 
Organization) of the CNR (National Revolutionary Council) was to take for the nation.
6
 
Brittain also explores the development of the Tribunaux Populaire 
 
Révolutionnaire (TPR- Revolutionary Popular Tribunals), aimed at reforming the 
country’s judicial system. She cites the “unprecedented explosion,” of small-scale 
“development initiatives across the country.”7   The author’s analysis of the gains on the 
domestic front, such as the building of “solidarity compounds” for the homeless, the 
nationalization of all lands and a national tree planting campaign to stop desertification in 
the Sahel is illuminating. However, she does not mention the successes and failures of 
later programs such as that of “agricultural self-sufficiency,” pursued thorough land 
reforms in the Sourou Valley, the Tambao railroad project and the reforms of primary, 
secondary, tertiary, and vocational educational systems. It is fair to point out that these 
programs had not started by the time she completed the article.
8    
Nevertheless, this work 
provides a detailed analysis of the year prior to 1982 and from 1983 to 1985 the period 
regarded as the ‘early’ revolutionary years. 
Belgian political scientist and scholar, Rene Otayek, has offered another 
perspective on the Burkinabé Revolution. His work, “The Revolutionary Process in 
 
6 
Ibid, 45-46. 
 
7 
Ibid, 46. 
 
8 
Rene Otayek, “The Revolutionary Process in Burkina Faso: Breaks and Continuities,” In John Markakis 
and Michael Waller, Military Marxist Regimes in Africa (London: Frank Cass and Company Limited, 
1986), 85. 
7  
Burkina Faso: Breaks and Continuities” was initially written and published in French. The 
English version appeared in John Markakis’ and Michael Waller’s edited book Military 
Marxist Regimes in Africa published in 1986.
9   
It situates the rise of the Burkinabe 
revolution in four events. First, the revolutionary government identified itself with low 
income groups, students, peasant farmers, and unemployed youth, a few of the many poor 
groups in Burkina Faso.  Revolutionaries wanted equality so they imposed salary cuts on 
higher wage earners (for example, secondary and tertiary educators, civil servants, and 
high-ranked army officers, to name a few) to make resources available to all citizens 
(particularly, the poor majority). Second, the government removed officials of 
former regimes from office. Third, the government appointed military cadets (or lower 
ranked military persons) into positions of power. Fourth, the CNR relied on staged pro- 
junta rallies to affirm the “rise of new social and political forces” in the country. These 
new political forces were created to support the CNR platform and to follow its leftist 
ideological orientation. Their arrival in Upper Volta was late compared to (some similar) 
political developments that had already taken place in some of the neighboring countries. 
For Otayek, the reversal of traditional political rule (between the Mossi 
chieftaincies, French educated civilian politicians and the military) and the ideological 
rivalries that existed between them presented ideologically ‘radical’ military men an 
opportunity to intervene in national politics.  What sets the Burkina example apart from 
other similar developments in the West African region, in the view of Otayek, was the 
successful attempt by the revolutionaries to match their verbal promises with action. 
They figuratively took power “from the hands of the bourgeoisie” and placed it in the 
 
 
 
9 
Ibid, 87. 
8  
hands of the people.
10 
They actually ruled top-down but not without expressing the desire 
to (eventually) cede power to what Sankara hoped would be a socially conscious people 
allied with his and the CNR’s idea of alternative government. 
The second generation of historical analysis of the revolution tends to situate it 
alongside other regional experiments of Socialism on the African continent or within the 
framework of ethnic histories inside the country. However, the only exception here is 
Samantha Anderson’s translation of Thomas Sankara’s speeches in Thomas Sankara 
Speaks, published in 1988.
11   
It is a primary source translated into English. She has 
carefully translated every speech delivered by Thomas Sankara that offers insight into the 
revolution. For example, each chapter focuses on a speech delivered by Sankara 
pertaining to the political, environmental and social situations in the country such as land 
misuse, gender and economic inequalities that he and the regime worked to correct. This 
source gives an excellent road map for scholars seeking to understand Thomas Sankara 
and his leadership of the revolution in Burkina Faso. This source contains evidence that 
reinforces this work’s central argument that Sankara’s intentions, at least rhetorically, to 
improve the lives of all peoples in Burkina Faso, were genuine, if not sincere. 
American anthropologist and former U.S. ambassador to the then Upper Volta, 
Elliot Percival Skinner wrote The Mossi of Burkina Faso: Chiefs, politicians, and 
soldiers in 1989. The book looks at the political development of the Upper Volta/ 
Burkina Faso and offers a nuanced analysis of the revolution.  His epilogue presents the 
 
 
 
 
10 
Ibid, 85. 
 
11 
Thomas Sankara, Thomas Sankara Speaks, 1. 
9  
revolution as the outcome of decades of political oppression of ordinary civilians by the 
political elites and their foreign backers. He writes: 
“What Sankara’s revolution demonstrates is… a new generation… tired of [how] 
the traditional chiefs and earlier politicians dealt with both local and global 
affairs…[They] want to chart a new course…[close] to the realities of power-locally, 
nationally, regionally, and globally.”12 
Belgian economist Pierre Englebert’s book, Burkina Faso: Unsteady Statehood in 
 
West Africa (1996) locates the revolution at two political junctures.
13   
First, the 
instabilities that Sankara and his cohorts inherited from a failed multiparty democracy 
under Maurice Yaméogo (1960-1966). Second, coups initiated by soldiers to reach 
political consensus in the country. 
The third generation of writing on the Burkinabe Revolution emerged after the 
year 2000. These include but are not limited to articles and books commemorating 
Sankara and the revolution. Three books in this period deal with the Revolution in 
Burkina Faso. The first is Victor T. Le Vine’s Politics in Francophone Africa. This book 
includes Sankara’s revolutionary initiatives. For example, Le Vine offers a comparative 
study of all countries that experienced revolt against traditional political structures. For 
Le Vine, “Sankara was different” because of his ability to follow development rhetoric 
with action. This was illustrated through the various local development initiatives that 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12 
Elliott P Skinner, The Mossi of Burkina Faso: Chiefs, Politicians and Soldiers (Prospect Heights, 
Illinois: Waveland, 1989), 237. 
 
13 
Pierre Englebert, Burkina Faso: Unsteady Statehood in West Africa, 58. 
10  
took place during his presidency aimed at liberating the Burkinabe from Upper Volta’s 
history of resource dependence.
14
 
The second is Jimmy D. Kandeh’s Coups from Below: Armed Subalterns and 
State Power in West Africa (2004). It looks at coups initiated by junior officers in West 
African countries. It is primarily concerned with the military’s hold on political power 
and how that institution became revolutionized under the leadership of Thomas Sankara. 
Kandeh sees a parallel between Sankara’s character and his regime. Unlike the previous 
leaders in Burkina Faso, Sankara tried to set a national example of power sharing through 
his policies. This book is important to this work because it supports the assertion of 
Sankara’s efforts to balance Burkina society by making the nation’s wealth available for 
all.
15   
Finally, in 2007, Pathfinder released the second edition of Sankara’s speeches: We 
Are Heirs to the World’s Revolutions, translated from French into English. In the preface 
to the second edition, Mary Alice Waters, president of Pathfinder press sums up the 
character and politics of Thomas Sankara: 
“Sankara believed in a world not created by ‘technocrats,’ 
financial wizards,’ or ‘politicians,’ but by the masses of 
peasants whose labor is praised and defended with the 
riches of nature, the source of all wealth being shared.”16 
 
 
 
If this is so, then scholars of the Burkinabe Revolution must pay more attention to 
the personality that fostered these alternative approaches to government. Again, the 
concern here is not the events and peoples that worked to discredit the movement 
 
 
 
14 
Victor T. Le Vine, Politics in Francophone Africa, 148. 
 
15 
Jimmy Kandeh, Coups from Below, 119. 
 
16 
Thomas Sankara, We Are Heirs of the World's Revolutions: Speeches from the Burkina Faso Revolution, 
1983-87 (New York, New York: Pathfinder, 2007), 11. 
11  
(although they cannot be overlooked) but rather those who tried to prolong its principles. 
Sankara’s environmental initiatives like combating land misuse, reforming the 
administration, and improving women’s rights are three of the many policies Sankara 
championed in his country to cleanse it of its past inequities. This work explores these 
three initiatives taken by the revolutionary government. 
12  
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter One: 
 
Upper Volta: From Colony to Burkina Faso (1897-1966) 
 
 
 
 
“Development in the past has always meant the increase in the ability to guard the independence 
of the social group and indeed to infringe upon the freedom of others-something that came about 
often irrespective of the will of the persons within the societies involved.” 
-Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (1972), p.4 
 
 
 
 
This chapter assesses the origins of the 4 August 1983 coup in the Upper Volta 
(now Burkina Faso) within the context of the political history of Upper Volta. Following 
an introduction of Upper Volta’s colonial history (1897-1960), this chapter explores the 
first six years of independence under a civilian presidency (Yameogo 1960-1966). 
Between 1897 and 1960, France colonized the territories occupied by the Mossi 
(kingdoms of Ouagadougou and the ‘Yatenga’ Mossi of Ouahigouya to name two), Peuls, 
Gurunsi, Marka, Lobi, Bwa, Bobo, and other ethnic groups within what is today Burkina- 
Faso. The French tried several times up until 1896 to subdue, by treaty, the Mossi people 
who resided near the bend of the Niger River. The French exploited inter-ethnic quarrels 
and used them to further undermine intra-ethnic relations. They needed more land and 
raw materials to develop forts on the coastal towns (on the Atlantic Ocean) they seized a 
decade earlier in Abidjan (Cote D’Ivoire), Dakar (Senegal), and Conakry (Guinea). The 
Niger River provided the French a more accessible water-way into the ‘French’ West 
African interior. From Bamako, the capital city of Burkina’s northern neighbor Mali, the 
13  
French had a suitable place to launch their conquests of the Mossi country to the 
southeast of the Malian capital. The French were eager to admit the Mossi lands and 
peoples into their growing overseas possessions.
1
 
French analysis of ethnic groups in ‘Burkina’ society appears to have rested on 
 
the paradigm of labeling and valuing the ‘strength’ of a people based on their interactions 
with others, and the land they occupy. From this they were able to devise ways to wrestle 
the land from the occupants by supporting one ethnic group against another in conflicts 
by usually siding with the group that they identified as being ‘weaker.’ The French 
colonial authorities recognized the similarities in social organization especially 
bureaucratization between themselves and the Mossi. This allowed the French to view the 
Mossi as superior to the other groups. Therefore, the French first focused their efforts on 
conquering and colonizing the ‘weaker’ ethnic groups surrounding the Mossi before 
turning their attention on the Mossi kingdom(s). 
With each passing year since 1887, the political autonomy of ethnic kingdoms in 
the territories that were to become Upper Volta (and subsequently Burkina Faso), were 
signed away through “treaties of protection.” In 1888, the ethnic-majority Fulani (Peul) 
cities of Dori and Sebba, in the north of the bend on the Black Volta, were conquered 
with the conclusion of treaties promising Peuls protection against their stronger neighbors 
the Mossi. The French tried again unsuccessfully in 1890 to sign a treaty with the Mogho 
naba of the Ouagadougou kingdom of the Mossi. Mogho Naba Wobgo was the 
undisputed ‘superior’ naba (or emperor) of the Mossi people.
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
Pierre Englebert, Burkina Faso, 18. 
 
2 
Ibid, 19. 
14  
The Mossi kingdom can be briefly surmised here as a loose (political) federation 
of ethnic Mossi. There were nabas in all of the cities of the Mossi kingdom, one that 
covered over half of the present day territory. Cities such as Ouagadougou, Ouahigouya, 
Tenkodogo and Koudougou (to name four), all had a naba who presided over the affairs 
of each ‘city-state’. These nabas (regents) reported to the Mogho naba who reigned over 
all the Mossi (with the Mogho naba taking residence in Ouagadougou, the de facto Mossi 
capital). In the three year period between 1892 and 1895, the French failed to gain 
Mogho Naba Wobgo’s signature of approval for a protectorate over Mossi lands but not 
without gaining Gurunsi lands to the south (in 1894). In the early months of 1895, ethnic 
Peuls (Fulani) signed treaties with the French giving them control over the lands to the 
far west of the country. 
The naba of the Yatenga kingdom, an ethnic Mossi kingdom of Ouahigouya 
rivaling that of the Mossi kingdom in Ouagadougou, signed his city and surrounding 
lands in the northern part of the ‘territory’ over to the French colonial administrators in 
April and renewed their status with the French in November of that year following a 
forced change in naba leadership (1895). Once the territories surrounding the Mossi 
Empire were subdued, the French moved in on Ouagadougou residents. On January 20, 
1897, the French succeeded in signing a protectorate with Kouka. He was the first French 
appointed naba and brother of the self-exiled Mogho Naba Wobgo. The successor of 
Mogho Naba Wogbo fled to Senegal a few days earlier, upon the news of the destruction 
of his army that he sent to confront the French advancement into his country.
3
 
 
 
 
 
3 
Patrick Manning, Francophone Sub-Saharan Africa, 1880-1985 (New York, NY: Cambridge University 
Press, 1988), 73. 
15  
From its creation in 1897, and the French settlement there up to 1919, the ‘Upper 
Volta’ ‘colony,’ experienced indigenous resistance and territorial name changes. As a 
territory under French marshal law, soon to be colony, the territory served as French 
West Africa’s human labor reserve. The French colonial administration divided the 
territory (covering modern day Burkina) into cercles (regions) without the regard for the 
traditional political boundaries of ethnic groups. The French built missionaries, schools, 
railroads and exported raw materials and peoples to other places outside of the Upper 
Volta ‘territory.’ The colonies of Cote D’Ivoire and Mali (to name two) were the 
benefactors of raw resources and laborers sent from the Upper Volta ‘territory’ to further 
the development of their economies.
4
 
Taxation, seizure of lands, forced labor and conscriptions generated resentment. 
The Mossi had enough in 1908 when a Muslim leader among them convinced peoples to 
cease paying taxes. He organized two thousand men to march on Ouagadougou. The 
rebellion was crushed less than thirty miles outside of the town. According to Englebert, 
the success of the French counter-attack saw an end to militant Mossi resistance. The 
Mossi were not the only group to resist colonial rule as other groups like the Gurunsi, 
Peul and Markas launched separate efforts to curtail French imperialism without 
success.
5
 
 
The ‘Upper Volta’ territory became a colony of its own in 1919 until 1932 when 
the French dissolved its status deciding that it was no longer profitable to remain a 
colony. The colony of Upper Volta experienced relative peace throughout its colonial 
history following the initial conquest and settlement of the French. The purpose of the 
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colony in these years was primarily economic. The French employed the Mossi and 
others for labor services in the mining and building of railways. 
Politically, French colonial policies insured that the economic policies were 
carried out by the Mogho naba. For example, the colony’s first governor, Edouard 
Hesling, instructed the Mogho Naba Kom II to organize men to erect the first 
administrative buildings. The colonial administration had 'Burkina' men and women plant 
and grow cotton, mine minerals, cut trees and pave roads for the transport of resources to 
neighboring colonies. They created a migrant worker class in where Africans “were 
forced to work away from their homes” to complete projects in neighboring ‘countries’ 
thus enabling more social rifts within the lands of the Volta.
6   
This occurred in 1922 
when the colony sent 2,000 men to work on railroads in Cote D’Ivoire. Another 6,000 
‘Voltaic’ were sent to construct the Thies-Kayes railway in Mali.7 
The colony of Upper Volta slowly gained political autonomy within the French 
community. This ‘community’ was composed of France and all of the nation’s overseas 
territorial possessions. Following the emancipation of France from Germany’s control at 
the close of World War II, the ‘Fourth-Republic’ felt obliged to reward the tirailleurs; 
French West African soldiers who served the French in WWII.  In 1944, French 
government recommended that colonial subjects receive political representation in 
French West African colonial affairs.
8
 
 
Colonial subjects in the Upper Volta colony ceased the moment to organize 
politically when the recommendations were made into policy in 1945. Within a year 
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following the conference in Brazzaville, Congo, Ouezzin Coulibaly (an ethnic Jula), was 
elected as Upper Volta’s first Consul General of the Constituent Assembly.9 Unitary 
political parties and federalist political parties blossomed in all of the territories of French 
West Africa. The parties were diverse and provided tough competition for seats in the 
Afrique Occidentale Françasie (AOF-French West African Union) Constituent 
Assembly.
10
 
The most notable federal political party to appear in the Upper Volta ‘territory’ 
 
(because the ‘colony’ was dissolved since 1932 and was not reinstated until 1947) was the 
Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (RDA-Democratic African Rally). Created in 
Bamako, Mali in 1946, the RDA took a radical stance by favoring direct independence 
over colonialism and (or) assimilation of Africans into the ‘French community’ 
(commonwealth). It also held the desire for all French colonies to unite, politically, into 
one legislative body. The RDA contained branches across French West Africa and served 
as the political blueprint for all political parties in the soon to be independent French 
West African nation-states. In the first year of the AOF assembly, Upper Volta had no 
direct representation as their first candidate lost to Houphouet-Boigny of Cote D’Ivoire. 
However, in 1946, Upper Volta received political representation by earning three out of 
the sixty-one seats available. 
Not all ‘Burkina’ supported the federalist aspirations of the RDA in the ‘territory’. 
They saw that there may have been more to gain if the ‘territory’ remained a ‘colony’ 
instead of uniting politically with other colonies in the AOF. The most notable nationalist 
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political party of the territory was the Union Voltaïque (UV-Voltaic Union). Originally 
called the Union pour la Défense des Intérêts de la Haute-Volta (Union for the Defense 
of the Interests of the Upper Volta), the UV party was created in 1945 by Mossi chiefs 
and their French-schooled offsprings.
11
 
The years between 1944 and 1960 witnessed a progression of political 
 
representation in the Upper Volta colony. The colony’s neighbors enjoyed political 
stability under strong unopposed leaders such as Cote D’Ivoire’s Houphouet-Boigny, a 
product of French education in the Ivory Coast colony and the party he represented, the 
RDA. The Upper Volta experienced (compared to neighbors) a multi-party system. 
Divisions within the RDA and the UV led to the creation of more political parties with 
very similar aspirations only differing in leadership and ethnic representation. 
The most notable political party leaders of these pre-independence years were 
Daniel Ouezzin Coulibaly, Phillipe Zinda Kabore, Nazi Boni, Gerard Kango Ouedraogo, 
Jospeh Conombo and Henri Guisso. These political leaders of the Upper Volta colony 
can be divided into two groups, the federalists and the nationalists. With the exception of 
Ouezzin Coulibaly and Phillipe Kabore supporting the RDA, the latter politicians in 
Boni, Ouedraogo, Conombo and Guisso leaned towards a nationalist independence. This 
was not without the leaders having disagreements with one another which resulted in the 
splintering of the UV into political parties with similar aims and different approaches. It 
was a system that reflected diversity on one end. One the other side, the various ethnic 
groups appeared to lack homogeneous political aspirations needed to secure a national 
identity (coherency).
12
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In 1956, the Loi Cadre (law tallies) granted universal suffrage for single electoral 
colleges, and most importantly gave territorial assemblies in each colony ministerial 
powers. This culminated in the rise of nationalist tendencies along with a steady decline 
of support for the federalists approach to replace the colony.
13 
The passing of the French 
law may have been both a blessing and a curse for Upper Volta politics. It led to further 
complications toward achieving political legitimacy as there existed many traditional 
(Mossi kingdom) and modern (RDA and UV) political parties following the French 
decrees. It was a blessing for nationalist oriented politicians in that the policy effectively 
curved federalist ambitions by allowing each colony to make political decisions for the 
subjects in its own domain. It was a curse because it undermined the unity brought about 
by a shared colonial experience and may have indirectly fueled the ethnic tendencies that 
kept groups confined. 
Ironically for the Upper Volta, the arrival of the Loi Cadre may have indirectly 
diminished the efforts of the pro-nationalist UV (Voltaic Union) to build support in the 
country. As a result, the nationalist party split into two camps in 1953. Around that time, 
the RDA (African Democratic Rally) party altered its name to appeal to the growing 
nationalist sentiments as a means to gain support from a splintered UV party. It is also 
fair to mention that the RDA had a strong grass-roots approach towards political 
mobilization unlike the UV’s French connections, especially with the colonial governor, 
Albert Jean Mouragues.
14 
The RDA appealed to Africans who wanted direct 
 
independence from France but uncertain whether they wanted a federalist or unitary 
political structure. Within ten years (from 1945 to 1956), the RDA was able (not without 
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some poll manipulations) to reinvent itself to appeal to the ‘Burkina’ population. They 
achieved this by taking a centrist approach toward the federalist and nationalist debate by 
creating party alliances that supported both positions. 
From 1957 to 1959, the Upper Volta colony flirted with the idea of joining the 
Mali Federation. Ideologically, this federation was to succeed the AOF as the first 
independent united band of former colonies with one political destiny. In reality, it 
became a two-month political union between Senegal and Mali that was originally 
intended to attract all French West African colonies to join. However, many of the 
colonies had more to gain by remaining independent ‘nations’ as opposed to opening 
their borders and politics to a regional ruling body. It is also worthy to note that “France 
and Ivory Coast brought pressure…to withdraw from the federation” and join the Conseil 
de l’Entente (Consul of “the Agreement”).15 Houphouët-Boigny’s creation of this consul 
provided ‘soon-to-be’ independent ‘nations’ an opportunity to continue positive relations 
with France while maintaining some modicum of autonomy. 
Shortly after the end of WWII, Maurice Yaméogo, an ordained minister and a 
second generation Upper Volta civilian politician, allied himself with the Union 
Démocratique du Voltaïque (UDV- Volta Democratic Union) party, a branch of the 
Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (RDA- Democratic African Rally). From 1946 to 
1958, Yaméogo rose from a general member to a Consul General of Upper Volta’s 
Territorial Assembly. The Democratic Voltaic Union branch of the African Democratic 
Rally (commonly referred to as the UDV-RDA) political party was created by 
Yaméogo’s friend and ally Houphouët-Boigny of the neighboring French colony of Coté 
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D’Ivoire to serve the populations of French West Africa (prior to independence 
movements). 
In the course of roughly fifteen years leading up to Upper Volta’s independence 
(in August 1960), the UDV branch of the RDA slowly gained popularity (not without 
political setbacks in the early 1950’s) in the colony (soon to be independent country). The 
arrival of independence on 5 August 1960 in Upper Volta may have been ceremonial for 
the UDV for it had already controlled much of the political matters in the country after it 
received more autonomy from France in the fall of 1958. On 8 December 1960, UDV 
representative Maurice Yaméogo was elected with a landslide 99.5 percent of the votes to 
preside over the newly independent government and the new unitary constitution of the 
Upper Volta. This constitution “set up a unicameral parliament, but still recognized 
multiparty politics” as the legislative force of national politics.
16
 
 
An ethnic Mossi, Nawalagmba Yaméogo was born in Koudougou on 31 
 
December 1921. He lived up to his native first name meaning “one who unites” by 
establishing a one-party state system in his country. He received the Christian name 
“Maurice” at the age of eight (1929) when he was baptized by French Catholics in a local 
monastery. Maurice Yaméogo (a.k.a. Mister Maurice) attended secondary school at a 
Catholic mission in Pabré. He married his first wife Felecite Zangre after completing his 
formal education in 1939. The following year, he became politically active by joining the 
colonial administration to serve as a civil servant.
17   
In the 1940’s, he joined the 
Confédération Française des Travailleurs Croyants union (CFTC-the French 
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Confederation of Working Believers) and received an official political post as a Consul 
General of the Territorial Assembly located in his home town, in 1946. He remained a 
member of the Territorial Assembly until he was requested in 1958 to join with Ouézzin 
Coulibaly. Coulibaly was distinguished Upper Voltaic political figure and a prominent 
member of the UDV-RDA party who died shortly before independence (as most of Upper 
Volta’s first generation of metropolitan politicians) leaving the mantle of the party’s 
presidency to Yameogo, a position he held until he was elected to serve as the country’s 
first president in 1960.
18
 
 
Now as president of the democratic and multiparty Republic of Upper Volta, 
Yaméogo did not see democracy as an adequate form of government for Upper Volta. 
For him, party politics did not promote national unity; strong personalities that attracted 
party supporters did. On the international stage, he feared that Upper Volta would be seen 
as a nation that lacked consensus at a time when the survival of former colonies was the 
most important political objective. He wasted little time in abandoning the multiparty 
constitution to favor a UDV-controlled one party state. In February 1962, a UDV-RDA 
congress assembled to declare the party’s “supremacy over all [national] institutions.”19 
Yameogo’s leadership was self-serving. He imposed tough austerity measures and 
 
limited opposition to his party in the last four years (1962-1966) of his presidency. In 
 
1963, Upper Volta saw the rise of a tyrant in president Yameogo. He worked to 
consolidate his power through unconstitutional appointments of family members to 
government posts such as the appointment of his siblings and cousins to the positions of 
prime minister, chief of staff and secretary of state. 
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Yameogo travelled often during his presidency and used government funds to 
finance lavish parties for foreign dignitaries. In 1964, he visited U.S. President Lyndon B. 
Johnson in Washington D.C. the only significance being to flaunt his excesses and to 
affirm his country’s new alliance with the United States. 
In December of 1965, President Yaméogo approved a 20% cut in the salaries of 
civil service employees accompanied by reductions in social security for retirees. His 
high austerity measures tested the patience of union leaders.
20   
On 3 January 1966, 
workers unions protested the salary cuts, and Yaméogo’s kleptomania, and nepotistic 
practices as Upper Volta’s first head of state. The civilian demonstrators called on the 
military to take over the reins of government. On that evening, Colonel Sangoulé 
Lamizana responded to the wishes of the demonstrators by placing Yameogo under 
arrest. On national radio, he declared himself head-of-state. This move made Lamizana’s 
actions “the first in a succession of numerous military coups.”21 
The army’s intervention in politics contributed to national instability (in diverse 
ways) by challenging the traditional and ethnic-based civilian political structures. Against 
the wishes of civilian groups such as union members, students and teachers, each military 
regime attempted to consolidate its control over the country. With each passing president 
ascending form the ranks of the military, citizens outside of the army witnessed a rise in 
the hunger for power by young soldiers with socialist and/or communist ideological 
convictions.
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Chapter Two: 
 
Remodeling the Republic: The Military and Politics in Upper Volta 
 
(January 1966-August 1983) 
 
 
 
This chapter looks at Upper Volta’s experiment with military regimes (1966- 
 
1980). It will also examine Thomas Sankara’s political career as a soldier by looking at 
his tenure as a Secretary of State under Colonel Saye Zerbo’s military government, and 
as President Jean-Batiste Ouédraogo’s Prime Minister. Finally, the chapter accounts for 
the first few months of revolution in Burkina Faso leading up to the first public criticisms 
of the revolution by the Syndicate National de Enseigneurs Africain de la Hauté Volta 
(SNEAVH-National Union of African Educators of the Upper Volta) in December 1983. 
On 4 January 1966, a deposed and detained Maurice Yaméogo, from the majority 
 
Mossi ethnic group, officially resigned from the presidency. Subsequently, he was 
banned from politics by General Sangolé Lamizana and also sentenced to four years of 
imprisonment. In the months following the overthrow of Maurice Yaméogo on 3 January 
1966, President Col. Lamizana appointed himself to the rank of General. 
 
The fourteen years of military rule under General Lamizana are summarized here 
in three stages. The first stage of his presidency (from 1966 to 1969) was to maintain the 
appearance of order by presiding as the undisputed leader of the country. The country at 
this time was under military martial law and it was represented by civilians carefully 
selected by the military. In Lamizana’s second stage of his presidency (from 1969 to 
1973), the appointment of a prominent civilian politician Joseph ki-Zerbo to the post of 
25  
Prime Minister symbolized the military’s move to restore civilian multiparty politics. The 
third stage of Lamizana’s rule, (the last seven years from 1973 to 1980), saw the 
suspension of civilian-led democracy through Lamizana’s creation of the Mouvement 
National pour le Renouveau (MNR-Movement for National Renewal) party, and gradual 
restoration of military martial law. 
Lamizana came from the ethnic Samo minority group located in the northwestern 
region of Upper Volta. In seeking to mediate a peaceful return to civilian political rule in 
the country, Lamizana tried to preserve the dominance of the Mossi “ethnic groups by 
serving as mediator” between the civilian groups and the nation’s various ethnic groups.1 
Lamizana’s decision to allow Mossi dominance in politics was attributed to two beliefs. 
 
The first is that the Mossi, sharing centuries of history with the territory (a land covering 
most of modern Burkina Faso), knew what was best for the modern state. Second, that as 
long as the Mossi allowed other ethnic groups equal representation in politics, that peace 
and political stability could be restored in the country. 
On the economic front, Upper Volta relied on loans from for its neighbor (Coté 
D’Ivoire) and former colonial power, France, to fund economic and urban development. 
Lamizana worked to maintain positive relations with both countries. He leased lands, 
favored foreign development models over local ones to attract more business to help pay 
the interest on loans. Upper Volta tried to compete with the rest of the world in providing 
free commerce, trade, safety, and technical innovation. 
In October of 1980, a teachers union organized strikes to call for the political 
involvement of the more progressive elements in the army. The union expressed 
dissatisfaction with Lamizana’s inability to curtail “corruption and nepotism” in the 
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country. Other dissatisfied members of the army noted the failures of Lamizana’s MNR 
which the teachers, workers, and students unions had pointed out.  Accusation of 
Lamizana’s government of “degeneration of social life and political confusion” in the 
country was all Colonel Saye Zerbo needed to act. On 25 November 1980, Zerbo 
overthrew Lamizana’s government and suspended the nation’s constitution, thus 
effectively ending the short-lived ‘Third Republic’ of Upper Volta.
2
 
 
On 27 August 1932, Saye Zerbo was born an ethnic Samo to a mother and father 
(names unknown) in a village called Tougan in the Sourou Province, located in the west 
of the country. Saye Zerbo received his secondary education abroad in Mali and Saint- 
Louis, Senegal. In his late twenties, Saye Zerbo joined the military and attended military 
academy in France. He was subsequently deployed in 1960 to serve in the Indochina war, 
and the Algerian war for independence (that had begun against the French in 1952). In 
1961, Saye Zerbo joined the (then) Upper Volta military. From 1974 to 1976, Saye Zerbo 
held a foreign minister position. Under the final four years of a democratically elected 
(retired General) President Lamizana, Saye served as a commander for Ouagadougou’s 
regiment. He also directed the country’s military intelligence agency.  On 4 November 
1980, this forty-two year old war veteran and military leader staged a coup to the delight 
of trade union strikers.
3
 
After seizing power, Colonel Saye Zerbo  moved to promote his party, the Comité 
Militaire pour le Redressement et le Progrès National (CMRPN-Military Committee for 
Reform and National Progress), as the governing party of the country. It was to operate in 
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Upper Volta as the only legal party to meet the challenges faced by ordinary civilians. He 
wanted to shift national focus from mediating ethnic-based political rivalries, which had 
been the priority of Lamizana’s government, to serving the needs of every citizen in the 
country.
4   
By failing to respond to popular demands for the eventual return to civilian 
rule, the Zerbo regime lost its legitimacy with the people. Large numbers of migrant 
workers, peasants, students, teachers, and lawyers protested military rule and called for a 
return to democratic rule in Upper Volta. 
President Zerbo fell because he failed to address the growing political tension 
between Mossi chiefs and the radical Marxist-oriented young soldiers (notably Sankara, 
Lingani, Zongo and Compaoré) in the military and the Patriotic League for Development 
(Lipad).
5   
On 7 November 1982, just days before Colonel Saye Zerbo’s second year as 
president of the Upper Volta, Colonel Gabriel Somé Yorian and infantry soldiers loyal to 
the Mossi chiefs, and favoring relations with Cote d’Ivoire and France, captured key 
installations (radio stations, military garrisons and the presidential palace) and arrested 
Saye Zerbo. Many citizens were uncertain as to who would emerge from this volatile 
crisis caused by trade union protests against prolonged military intervention in civilian 
politics. 
 
Zerbo’s Comité Militaire de Redressement pour le Progrès National (CMRPN- 
Military Committee for Recovery for National Progress) and the national army (diverse 
in ideology and growing in influence) fought for the support of the politically diverse 
civilian parties. As Englebert has observed, the “soldiers saw themselves [as] capable of 
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correcting the policies of other soldiers.”6 The position of president in the Upper Volta 
after Lamizana was weakened. In the eyes of many, the president appeared to be a 
figurehead in the executive branch of government. The role of president became a fragile 
one given the failure of a diverse group of people in the country to reach a consensus on 
various issues. 
Conservative forces in the army under the direction of Commandant Gabriel 
Some Yorian answered the demands of the Unions. Frustrated by their exclusion from 
Zerbo’s thirty-one member military and civilian regime, Yorian and his supporters came 
to the aid of Zerbo’s  political rivals to have him removed from power. Trade unions 
were not pleased with Zerbo’s anti-protest and party banning politics.  Within hours 
following the successful coup, the first Conseil de Salut du Peuple (Council for Salvation 
in People-CSP-I) was established with one-hundred and twenty members representing 
both civilians and soldiers. 
The CSP-I regime was established by Yorian following his successful coup 
against President Zerbo. After the coup, Médicin-Commandant Jean-Baptiste Ouédraogo 
was installed by the coup leaders as president and to accomplish two short-term goals. 
The first was to play a balancing game by appointing commissioned and non- 
commissioned officers of the national army to serve government positions.  Second, 
Ouédraogo reshuffled the cabinet to incorporate younger officers of the army. Both 
measures were pursued to appease the growing political ideological left within the 
national army that included young soldiers such as Sankara.  These short-term objectives 
did not satisfy the long-term goals of progressive (socialist and/or communist leaning) 
forces within the military. These progressive forces wanted a cleansing of the Upper 
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Volta government of all conservative (democratic, pro-western) and reactionary 
 
(ideologically right leaning) forces. 
 
The presidency of Médicin-Commandant Jean-Baptiste Ouédraogo covered a 
period of roughly 10 months with Col. Some Yorian secretly serving as the policy maker. 
It was characterized by ideological disagreements with the civilian population over the 
political destiny of the nation and the place and purpose of the military in national 
politics. Within the army, there were two opposing ideological groups who disagreed 
over how the country should be governed. Conservatives supported the power of Mossi 
chiefs and civilian political groups and radical soldiers supported communist and/ or 
socialist styled government. In the course of 1983, three characters personified the 
divisions over policy within the army. A conservative army colonel in Some Yorian 
launched a coup against the Zerbo regime with the aim to restore Yameogo to power. 
Following the successful coup on 25 November 1982, Yorian installed his conservative 
ally and realist in the army medical doctor Médicin Commandant Jean-Baptiste, to hold 
the position of president of Upper Volta. 
Captain Thomas Noel Sankara, a radical idealist, was selected by the coup leaders 
to hold the high post of prime minister. This was done to appease civilians and soldiers 
who supported Sankara’s progressive (radical) ideas. These two men (Ouédraogo and 
Sankara) occupied the higher positions in a politically fragile CSP (I) regime until 
Sankara’s resignation and subsequent house arrest on 17 May 1983. Shy and soft-spoken, 
Jean-Baptiste, a Mossi, pursued Yorian’s agenda of preparing laws that could allow the 
return of Yameogo to the presidency, a policy pursued after Sankara’s removal from 
politics on 17 May 1983. This date also officially begins the CSP II (a regime purged of 
30  
the radical representation by conservatives). In the months leading to the August 
revolution of 1983, the president (Jean-Baptiste Ouédraogo) reinstated the press and 
union freedoms that were suspended following the November 1982 coup as a way to win 
popularity and gain legitimacy with the people. His move did strengthen his popularity 
with the people. However, that inadvertently allowed Sankara to build his political career 
as a soldier and politician following his house-arrest on 17 May 1983.
7
 
 
These new freedoms allowed by the CSP II regime (Ouédraogo still president 
with Sankara no longer the prime minister) empowered the press and the teachers’ and 
other workers’ unions to advocate for more freedom. Ouédraogo also released political 
prisoners (while keeping Sankara under house arrest). By lifting the ban on pro- 
conservative/democratic strikes, the CSP conservatives hoped to win the loyalty of large 
numbers of people, particularly those who wanted the Upper Volta to return to a 
democratic state.  However, in doing so, their political rivals (radical/ socialist and/or 
communists) also gained popularity with the people. These people, primarily composed 
of low wage earners and the poor, were represented by groups such as the Lipad 
(Patriotic League for African Development) and the ULC (The Union of Communist 
Struggles). Supporters of Sankara saw a man who wanted to transform Upper Volta 
completely for the betterment of not just those in the government but for all citizens. 
Sankara, an ethnic Silmi-Mossi (a cross between Mossi and Fulani) was born in 
Yako, a city west of the capital Ouagadougou on 21 December 1949. He was the son of a 
former World War II soldier of Mossi ethnic descent and a woman from the ethnic 
Fulani.
8   
Following WWII, Sambo Joseph Sankara (1919-2006), Thomas’ father, a 
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catholic by faith, was employed by the French colonial government as a postal clerk. 
Joseph Sankara’s job required a great deal of travel and his son Thomas was able to see 
different cities at an early age that may have influenced his political orientation. 
Marguerite Sankara, Thomas’ mother, worked equally hard to provide for him and his 
nine other siblings. Sankara’s family mobility helped to enhance Thomas’ geographical 
knowledge of the nation because he knew the country well. Through this opportunity of 
travel, Thomas Sankara and his family may have gained a greater appreciation for Upper 
Volta’s ethnic diversity beyond their hometown. Perhaps those relationships with various 
people in his travels as a child with a catholic upbringing may have shaped Sankara’s 
socialist aspirations. 
Sankara went to primary school in Gaoua and attended high school in Bobo- 
Dioulasso. His parents wanted him to become a priest but he insisted on joining the 
country’s military. According to Pierre Englebert, in the year of the country’s first coup 
(1966), seventeen year old Thomas Sankara studied and received his baccalaureate at the 
Kadiogo military cadet school in the capital Ouagadougou.
9   
History professor and Lipad 
(Patriotic League for African Development) member Amadou Touré may have been the 
first to introduce Sankara to Socialist, Marxist, and Communist teachings.
10
 
Stationed at the Antsirabe military academy in Madagascar from 1970 to 1973, 
 
Sankara witnessed the rise of socialism there led by students and unions as he had in his 
teenage years in the Upper Volta when student and union protests prompted Yaméogo’s 
overthrow (1966). He returned to his home country in 1974 to fight in what was to be the 
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first border “war” with Mali.11   In the course of the six years (1974-1980) leading up to 
his first government position of Secretary of State under General Saye Zerbo, Sankara’s 
charisma grew. He was viewed by many in the country as a war hero through his 
appointment to Commander of the military garrison at Pô by Zerbo in 1976.
12   
Sankara 
gained the favor of left-wing political groups. 
Sankara’s initial anti-conformist, anti-capitalist, pro-revolutionary stance attracted 
many disenchanted youth from the streets to rally behind his idealism. Much of Sankara's 
support came from the youth in villages. They found his personal and family life 
appealing. Sankara’s personal popularity grew in 1981 when he was appointed by Zerbo 
to serve as Secretary of State. Within a few months of holding that office, Sankara 
resigned in the spring of 1982 when he denounced wage cuts for poorer civilians by the 
government. Sankara could relate to the majority of the economically disadvantaged in 
the country who worked hard for too little. His life in the Upper Volta must have been 
shaped by the many travels he made across the country with his father who was a postal 
clerk and career soldier. Sankara’s experiences in the military also helped to shape his 
progressive views. 
Before the revolution, Sankara was not pleased with the destiny of Upper Volta 
Republic. The system of government was corrupt.
13   
With the exception of Lamizana and 
Sankara, all presidents of Upper Volta (Burkina Faso) were ethnic Mossi. Lamizana was 
an ethnic Samo minority and Sankara was a Silmi-Mossi (a mix between Mossi and 
Peul). With the exception of Sankara, all presidents worked to preserve the Mossi 
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dominance in politics. Neighboring Côte d’Ivoire and distant France had looked to the 
ethnic Mossi as the legitimate power in the country (Burkina Faso) and worked to 
maintain relationships with the wealthy peoples such as village chiefs in the ethnic group. 
The Mossi were the first choice as trade partners for foreign entrepreneurs. It was these 
kinds of political patronage that Sankara’s revolution was aimed at uprooting. It is, 
therefore not surprising that the August Revolution was hailed by many in Burkina Faso. 
Robert Melson sees revolutions as “necessary…just because the old regimes were 
invariably based on patterns of domination.”14   Revolts are political processes that have a 
common history. Praetorian rule was common in West Africa in the 1980’s. Burkina Faso 
was not exempt from how many African nations were governed. In order to receive aid 
from the IMF (International Monetary Fund) and the WB (World Bank), many leaders in 
West African nation-states were required to install or uphold democratic institutions in 
their countries. One of the ways of receiving aid was to achieve the appearance of a 
transparent nation in the eyes of “first-world” (developed) nations. Host nations (“third- 
world” countries) would admit foreign assistance in the form of government and non- 
governmental development programs.
15
 
All presidencies prior to Sankara’s claimed a swift return to civilian controlled 
 
politics and stood behind their French and Ivoirian allies and investors. Calls for 
democracy by presidents before Sankara were aimed to please and reassure the safety of 
foreign investors. As a result, foreign aid from these countries to (Upper Volta) before 
Sankara and Burkina Faso was much higher in proportion to the aid received between the 
years 1983 to 1987. For example, foreign aid from France “fell from 43.5 million in 1983 
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to 26.8 million in 1985.” Sankara’s revolution stressed the importance of self-reliance 
through the local organization and resource sharing. As a result, the president’s ambitions 
for local development, particularly in the early years of the revolution (1983 to 1985), 
witnessed cuts in foreign aid and programs.
16
 
The Revolution in Burkina Faso was in many ways a reaction to what has become 
a monetary reward for making multi-party democracy the only system of governance. It 
was also a reaction to the failures of previous regimes in the Upper Volta to provide equal 
opportunities for sharing the resources and land of the country.
17 
For example, Yameogo 
used government funds to celebrate his second marriage with trips to Paris and Brazil.
18
 
It can also be argued here that the rise of revolutionary sentiment in the Upper 
Volta occurred when Sankara was appointed by Major Jean-Baptisté Ouédraogo to serve 
as Prime Minister in the spring of 1983. As Prime Minister, Sankara pushed for 
diplomatic relations with Algeria, Libya, North Korea, Ghana and Nicaragua.
19   
These 
nations did not have any diplomatic relations with Upper Volta prior to Sankara’s 
appointment. Sankara wished to ally Upper Volta with these nations because he felt that 
they shared similar experiences with colonialism (whether it be Spanish, Portuguese, 
French, Dutch or English). But Sankara did not serve in this position for a longer period. 
He was removed from office on 17 May 1983. On the same day, the more conservative 
Council of Salvation in People (CSP II) regime was formed. It worked until 4 August 
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1983 to release and reinstate previous political figures like Yameogo in power. That did 
not please many civilians and a (politically radical) segment of the military. 
Prior to 4 August 1983, students and workers protested, demanding Sankara’s 
release from house arrest. On the afternoon of this day, Captain Blaisé Compaoré, the 
commander of the garrison at Pô and a close friend of Sankara’s since 1976, organized 
two-hundred solders to capture key instillations in Ouagadougou. In the evening of 4 
August 1983, soldiers loyal to Compaoré captured the radio station in Ouagadougou, key 
garrisons and the presidential palace and announced the release of Sankara and the 
establishment of a national revolution with Sankara as its leader. 
Samuel Decalo has argued in his Coups and Army Rule in Africa (1990) that two 
reasons account for military coups in post-colonial Africa. The first is that fraudulent 
democratic institutions plagued by “social, economic, and political problems” attract 
military rule. The second is that the military has become the force that reasserts 
‘integrity’ in systems of government.
20 
The Burkina Faso example (surprisingly not 
 
included in Decalo’s work) is no different from the analysis he offers. Sankara’s military 
regime was in many ways a top-down rule. Nevertheless, was distinguishes Sankara’s 
from other similar military regimes in the continent in the 1980’s was the attempt to 
organize actions to meet the rhetoric toward uplifting women, cleaning up the 
environment and reforming the government (among many other issues such as health and 
education). 
The architects of the August Revolution not only claimed to act on behalf of the 
people in the country, they tried to physically organize citizens to complete the tasks 
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(though reminiscent of French colonial labor practices). They waged a war against the 
historical circumstances identified by them in the country. They were against the wealthy, 
chiefdoms (traditional rule), and corrupt politicians. Sankara and his followers moved to 
direct national attention away from president Ouédraogo’s demands for a return to “a 
new normal constitutional life” toward a popular revolt against traditional political, 
social, and economic life in the Upper Volta.
21
 
In the spring of 1983, Upper Volta (Burkina Faso as of 1984) established new 
relations with Libya, the PLO (Palestinian Liberation Organization), Cuba, and 
Nicaragua under Prime Minister Sankara. Following the August 4 coup, Sankara’s first 
act was to renegotiate and strengthen those relations with the revolutionary government. 
Sankara wanted the Upper Volta to identify with only the peoples and countries that did 
not want to continue diplomatic relations with France. The revolutionaries pointed to the 
historical ‘injustices’ of French colonialism  imposed on their people as the sole reason 
and justification for Sankara and his followers wanting to end diplomatic relations with 
France. 
The 4 August 1983 coup occurred in an already stratified society. Sankara and 
others made efforts to remedy the problem of ethnic politics in Upper Volta particularly 
the exploitive interactions between local Mossi chiefdoms and Upper Volta’s military. A 
Sankara led presidency tried to move beyond what Englebert considered “a dull and 
marginal nation at the periphery of the world” to make Upper Volta “the new child 
prodigy of anti-imperialism, Third World pride, and development.”
22
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Chapter Three: 
 
Sankara’s Revolution: Revolutionaries Burkina Faso (1983-1987) 
 
 
 
 
This chapter looks at what the revolutionary government of Captain Thomas 
Sankara did to transform the Upper Volta (into Burkina Faso) to address the various 
social, political and economic issues facing the country. Victoria Brittain has suggested 
that “the August revolution represented people’s seizure of power” by a segment of the 
military acting on their behalf than a mere army takeover.
1   
For her, the coup plotters 
under the command of Captain Blaisé Compaoré in Pô, acted on behalf of a distressed 
segment of the general population. In heeding their cries for the release of Sankara and 
other political prisoners, Compaoré led over 200 soldiers out of Pô north of Ouagadougou 
to overthrow forces loyal to president Ouedraogo. 
Blaisé Compaoré’s paratrooper squads proceeded to release Thomas Sankara 
from house arrest in Ouagadougou. On that evening (4 August 1983), Sankara and 
Compaoré captured the radio station in Ouagadougou and serenaded civilians with 
military music. Shortly after, the revolutionaries proclaimed the triumph of the Conseil 
National de la Révolution (CNR-Consul of the National Revolution) and a curfew was 
announced. 
The Organization Militaire Révolutionnaire (ORM-Revolutionary Military 
Organization), the nuclei of the CNR, consisted of Thomas Sankara, Blaise Compaoré, 
Boukary Lingani, and Henry Zongo. This governing body saw a need to develop the 
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country’s government not on the periphery of French civilization or on the exploitive 
tendencies of the ethnic Mossi, but on a new mentality that called people to show power, 
share power, and to identify with and break away from those that exploited them. 
Arguably, this self-reliant politics was not started by Sankara but he was eager to uphold 
it. Unlike previous regimes in the country, the CNR lacked a precise ideology.
2
 
Yet, the coup leaders embraced the equal distribution of resources policies 
 
inherent in both communist and socialist ideologies. The junta was committed to building 
in Burkina Faso, an egalitarian society. Moreover, Sankara’s government moved swiftly 
to reorient the country’s ideological stance in international affairs for the purpose of re- 
establishing relations with Nicaragua, Cuba, Libya, and the Palestinians first established 
by him when he served as Prime Minister in 1982. This move served two purposes. First, 
it presented Burkina Faso as a champion of its own political destiny as a member of the 
Non-Aligned Movement outside of the influences of the French and the Ivory Coast 
(Côte d’Ivoire). Second, Burkina Faso joined a growing number of ‘third-world’ nations 
that did not declare an alliance with the United States, the United Kingdom, France, 
Russia (formally the Soviet Union), and China in the late Cold War period. 
The revolutionaries envisioned themselves as the saviors of Upper Volta. They 
wanted to free the Burkinabe from the torment posed by debts owed to French and 
Ivorian governments and private investors. They considered themselves the architects of 
a new politics aimed at fighting against “imperialism.”3   Sankara opposed nations that 
used force to make people to serve their social, economic and political purposes. 
Sankara's speeches acknowledged that Burkina Faso had conformed for too long but 
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would no longer do so in a world shaped by the interest of Britain, France, Russia, China, 
and the United States.
4
 
On 2 October 1983, the Discours d’orietation politique (DOP-Orientation of 
Political Discourse), authored by Valére Somé, a close associate and ally of Sankara, was 
broadcast on public radio that day. The document presented Upper Volta as history in the 
typical framework of a society steeped in class conflict. Perhaps the object was to present 
the revolution as the legitimate Marxist response to this particular socio-economic 
condition.  The document opens by praising the “triumph” of the August coup.  Next, the 
speech compares Upper Volta’s struggles against French imperialism to those of other 
countries in the world such as Vietnam and Algeria.
5 
The document viewed the poor and 
 
their struggles as the legitimate objective of revolutionary change. The poor as a 
category, included students, peasants, and political dissidents of previous regimes. 
This document encouraged people to form local Comités de Défense de la 
Révoluion (CDR-Committees for the Defense of the Revolution) to defend the revolution 
from reactionary forces. It also aimed to unite these new social forces (in these CDRs) to 
combat corruption in the country by reforming the administration.
6
 
The document identifies the wealthy classes as potential “enemies of the people” 
 
by assuming their alliances with wealthy “imperialist” nations abroad particularly France 
and Cote d’Ivoire. True to the spirit of the document, the military regime identified itself 
and the poor as “the people” and regarded both as the revolutionary vanguard. The rest of 
society that did not fall into these strict categories was left to choose a side, whether to be 
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with the “people” or to become “enemies of the people.”  The regime’s Comités de 
Défense de la Révoluion (CDR-Committees for the Defense of the Revolution), were 
initially composed of unemployed youth, elders, women and anyone else identifying with 
low or no income earners.   Their task was to create and carry out programs of 
development that will meet the needs of their communities. 
Along with the call for the creation of CDRs, the DOP document also set new 
roles for the military and women in the economy of revolutionary Burkina Faso. The 
military put itself at the service of the revolutionary vanguard (the poor) with specific set 
of rules to follow alongside with the local CDR(s). What made Sankara’s revolution 
compelling and genuine was the effort to right the wrongs of its national history in two 
ways. First, Sankara identified the majority of the population, women, as equal partners 
of the revolution’s struggle against oppression. Second, that Sankara made a commitment 
to include them in decision making.   The revolutionary government divided the economy 
into four sectors for reform: agrarian, administrative, educational, and production. This 
work will focus on three areas in which Sankara’s revolutionary policies reformed the 
national government, raised awareness and improved the environment (a sub component 
of his agrarian reform), and restructured gender issues and relations. 
The young revolutionary leaders believed in their ability to change their country 
for the better compared to their political predecessors. First, they did not want the rest of 
the world to see their coup as a typical military intervention. So, they presented their 
coup as a popular uprising aimed at serving two purposes. First, to repudiate Ouedraogo’s 
regime and all the others for their inabilities to provide political peace and coherency 
among the various ethnic and political groups in the country following independence (5 
41  
August 1960). Second, they wanted to prove to the public that this military leadership 
identified with their disapproval of the government by making it their mission to take 
charge in reforming the exercise of political power. 
They immediately pursued politics aimed at improving and protecting the lives of 
all citizens as opposed to upholding the self-indulgent policies of previous military 
regimes. Sankara aimed to accomplish many issues under his presidency concerning 
health, education, environment, gender equality and economy. Sankara and the 
revolutionaries moved to reorganize the national government into one that represented 
the aspirations of all parties (with particular favor for those leaning to the ideological 
left). They also focused on the environment and devised quick solutions to help curve 
degradation. Furthermore, Sankara championed the rights of women. Finally, they 
banned local chiefs from receiving tributes economic and/or service from their subjects. 
Sankara used his personal profile: military exploits with Mali (1974), as Secretary 
of Defense (1981) and as Prime Minister (1982) to inspire people. These achievements, 
coupled with an ideological mesh of Marxist-Leninist and catholic beliefs, set him apart 
from his colleagues. A majority of Sankara’s colleagues followed the Islamic faith, one 
shared by 90 percent of the country. Nevertheless, these Muslim revolutionaries and their 
Christian leader worked to build a self-reliant country based not on the historical 
commercial relations with Upper Volta’s regional (Cote D’Ivoire) and global (French) 
partners, but a country that drew upon the hard-work of its workers and peasants.
7   
Quite 
 
simply, the revolutionaries aimed to create an egalitarian society in Burkina Faso by first 
setting the example as military men. 
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Captain Thomas Sankara and his colleagues attempted to establish (or invent) a 
nation of people living against the tradition of dependence on foreign aid. The battle to 
maintain a government focused exclusively on self-sufficiency, literacy, and meeting 
basic needs with transparent leadership did not last. Nevertheless, the four years and two 
months of this revolutionary regime was a striking example of government accountability 
to the people never seen in the Upper Volta. Before the August coup, political 
incumbents under previous regimes used their positions to serve private interests as 
opposed to collective civilian needs. 
Sankara was the first head of state in Upper Volta to use government to reduce the 
social, political and economic disparities between ordinary citizens and political elites. 
He tried to accomplish this through austerity measures and organizational strategies. A 
key action taken by the Sankara government was an austerity measure that called for the 
reduction of civil servant salaries. For him, it was simply a matter of demanding fairness 
from those who enjoyed “champagne” and giving some relief to those who drank only 
water.
8 
The initiatives undertaken by Sankara in the initial stages of the CNR and CDRs 
presented hope for a people ravaged by environmental disasters and social corruption. 
The revolutionaries opposed private business, a practice all too common in post 
independent Africa among political elites. They strove to establish their regime as an 
alternative approach in Africa toward African nation building without Western donors 
and investors. 
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It is important to note that the French colony of Upper Volta had served as a 
human labor reserve.
9   
Cote d’Ivoire and Mali had relied on these migrant laborers from 
the Upper Volta to build and repair railways, roads and bridges for regional resource 
extraction by France. The government under Sankara moved to control and shift Upper 
Volta’s economic resources and labor force away from foreign development demands to 
refocus them on meeting the basic needs of all Burkinabe citizens. 
Nevertheless, not all of the people of the country participated in Sankara’s 
economic, political and social revolution or even appreciated it. In the education sector, 
there were teachers, administrators, and students who were affected by the revolutionary 
government’s salary and tuition cuts. In the private sector, business and land owners lost 
land in the government’s land nationalization policy which took effect in the spring of 
1984. Chiefs (traditional rulers) were not supportive of Sankara’s policies against 
monetary tributes to and obligatory labors performed for them. 
In the weeks following their usurpation of the government’s executive powers, 
leaders of the CNR allied themselves with the Union des Luttes Communistes (ULC- 
Union of Communists Struggles) and the Ligue Patriotique pour le Développement 
(Lipad-Patriotic League for Development) parties. The CNR launched its own 
administrative reforms. They moved to condemn and remove the practices of previous 
political regimes, namely the domination of the nation’s politics by the ethnic Mossi. 
Sankara and his military revolutionaries intended to direct their country away from what 
he and others in his camp perceived as “twenty-three years of imperialist exploitation and 
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domination” under the previous leaders. In doing so, he challenged the policies and 
programs that had hitherto been pursued in the country. 
On the social front, Sankara believed the existing state institutions failed to 
benefit the many ethnic groups in the country. He wished to champion, in Upper Volta 
(Burkina Faso), a national consensus through the establishment of a one party state, 
environmental preservation, and women’s rights.  Sankara wanted to move his country 
away from foreign economic models that previous regimes adopted to keep receiving aid 
and shift the national economy to one of self-reliance. Politically, the junta leaders of the 
1983 revolution promised to deliver to all citizens ethnic and economic equality that 
democratic and multiparty processes had failed to achieve for the nation in the previous 
years. 
The new regime shifted the national priorities from “the protection of individual 
rights and liberties” to collective ownership of national resources.  It stressed the need for 
more sovereignty and less reliance on aid resources from France, Cote D’Ivoire, and 
other French-speaking West African nations. Sankara’s government sought to restructure 
the institutions of the state to guarantee food and shelter to many people in Burkina Faso. 
The first order of business for the Sankara regime was to reform the government. 
This was a daunting task given the country’s history of tense relations between civilian 
political parties and the military. Victoria Brittain’s interviews with Mohamed Maiga in 
December 1983, a Malian journalist for Afrique Asia in the country at the time, reveals 
the struggles for power between conservative and radical civilian and military forces and 
the infighting between radicals in the military and civilian groups such as the Ligue 
45  
Patriotique pour le Développement (Lipad- Patriotic League for Development) over 
appointment to government posts.
10
 
To resolve what the military leaders saw as divisions at home, the revolutionary 
government put part of the national policy decisions in the hands of CDR’s made up of 
groups the government described as the “people.” These were the poor, women and youth 
in the Upper Volta (declared Burkina Faso on August 1984), many of whom had poor 
relations with “enemies of the people” (wealthy classes) prior to and during the 
revolution. One of the first examples that Captain Thomas Sankara and his colleagues did 
upon their rise to power in the Upper Volta and that distinguished them from other coups 
in this period was their fight against corruption in the administration. This was achieved 
two ways. 
The Tribunaux Populaires de la Révolution (TPR-Popular Revolutionary 
Tribunals) was established shortly of the coup in October 1983. Rhetorically, it was 
intended to operate as a people’s court in that it allowed the “genuine participation…of 
toiling and exploited masses in the administration.” In action, the TPR was intended to 
replace the country’s French-modeled judicial system. It took the shape of  “five CDR 
members, one soldier, and a magistrate” without the presence of lawyers nor due process. 
The TPR’s tried, convicted, and/or acquitted many for embezzlement, fraud, and other 
actions the courts deemed offensive.
11 
Previous heads of state were brought before TPRs. 
 
Lamizana (1966-1980) was acquitted of charges, Ouedraogo(1982) and ki-Zerbo(Prime 
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Minister under Lamizana from 1969-1973) was fined and Zerbo received a 15 year 
sentence for the corruption charges brought against them.
12
 
The second reform in administration was the creation of the Commission du 
Peuple pour la Prevention de la Corruption (CPPC-Commission of People for the 
Prevention of Corruption).This commission aimed to prevent corruption by requiring top 
officials of government (Sankara included) to present a record of their assets and personal 
earnings.
13 
This was not a huge practice in sub-Saharan African nation-states in the 
1980’s. The commission revealed that Sankara’s holdings as president were modest. He 
 
earned a low presidential salary and owned few possessions as his lifestyle seemed to 
reflect frugality over luxury. 
The revolutionary military regime under Thomas Sankara violated the DOP 
speech’s agreement to civilians by appointing an American and French-trained Captain 
Pierre Ouedraogo (no relation to former president Jean-Baptiste Ouedraogo), an ethnic 
Mossi, to the important position of Secretary General of the CDR’s over the civilian 
political group Lipad’s choice of trade union leader Soumane Touré.  This choice did not 
please the civilian supporters of the military regime and Lipad members expressed their 
displeasure to foreign media such as The Guardian, Radio France, and Agency Presse 
France. After a foiled right-wing counter- revolutionary coup in the summer of 1984(the 
first launched against Sankara’s government), seven plotters were summarily executed 
and two Lipad leaders were detained for their alleged ties to the perpetrators. In this 
period, known as “clarification,” the military, perhaps lacking trust in the civilian 
political elements following the first countercoup attempt, asserted itself to lead the 
16 
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civilian political parties on all issues raised in the DOP speech. This resulted in the 
withdrawal of the socialist oriented Lipad party from its participation in the revolution.
14
 
The exit of Lipad from the revolutionary government gave more power to the 
remaining civilian pro-revolutionary political groups, especially the Union des Luttes 
Communistes (ULC-The Union of the Communist Struggle). For the military, this new 
political reality allowed Sankara, Compaoré, Lingani and Zongo to create new political 
parties such as the Union des Femmes du Burkinabé (UFB-Union of Burkinabe Women) 
and the Union Nationale des Anciens du Burkina (UNAB-the National Union of Elders in 
Burkina Faso). These newly created parties were pro-revolutionary in stance. The 
military leaders “left no social stratum untouched” in making themselves the creators of a 
new political structure in Burkina Faso.
15
 
On 4 August 1984, Sankara nationalized all lands. This radical measure served 
two-purposes, one, to disrupt “the power of traditional chiefs,” and to increase grain 
production by shifting management power to peasant farmers. Prior to the revolution, all 
peoples, rich and poor, had access to land but, they did not have “control over and 
management of” lands in the country. Englebert describes the pre-revolutionary land use 
as a system that functioned in near autarky for resources produced for local 
consumption.
16
 
 
Mossi farmers worked with their families and their use of land with other ethnic 
groups were communal in the production of goods for local consumption. Sankara gave 
the land and the power of managing it to the “people” (those poor classes in Burkina 
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Faso) The results (particularly for cotton) in the early years of the revolution (1983 to 
 
1985) from the government’s land reforms were favorable as producer prices rose being 
that lands were easier to access for the poor majority following legislation.
17
 
The revolutionaries also addressed the issues facing the environment, that of 
desertification and drought. In April of 1985, they launched the “three struggles” (‘tree’ 
struggles) program. The first and second “struggles” aimed to combat bush fires and 
arbitrary wood cutting.
18   
Those caught in the act of either starting bush fires or cutting 
trees down without authorization had to either pay fines, serve jail time and/or plant trees. 
The third of the “three struggles” program launched a national tree planting campaign, 
declaring that “every happy event…is celebrated with a tree planting ceremony.”19 
When a couple got married, they had to plant a tree. When nomads were caught in 
 
the act of violating the government’s environmental laws, they were made to plant trees. 
For all occasions, citizens were strongly recommended to plant trees to help restore the 
environment. No other government prior to Sankara’s had stressed the importance of the 
environment along with policy and courses of action toward slowing environmental 
degradation. 
The acknowledgement of women as equal partners in Burkina Faso’s revolution is 
perhaps the hallmark of the Sankara regime in regards to the CNR’s sincerity in 
attempting to fulfill the promises made to citizens. The regime created educational 
programs on female circumcision practices, appointed women to government positions, 
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and recruited more women into the army. Sankara’s policies banned and criminalized 
female circumcision in Burkina Faso’s Muslim society, forced marriages and polygamy 
while creating and placing women in places of power where they were previously absent. 
Sankara created the country’s first Ministry of Family Development.20 The ministry 
dedicated its services to educating Burkinabe women on home economics, effective 
child-rearing, and AIDS awareness and prevention (to name three). 
Issues such as Sankara’s decision to ban and criminalize female circumcision 
received strong reaction from civilians given that ninety per cent of the population 
practiced the Islamic faith. The revolution disrupted this cultural and religious practice 
for two reasons. One, Sankara wanted to cut the powers of traditional leaders and 
reinforce the authority of the revolutionaries. The second was to modernize the 
conditions of women in the country in accordance with the tenets of United Nations 
conventions on the dignified treatment of women.
21
 
 
The regime also created a national day for gender role swap on October 8 and a 
week (Week of the Women) first held in 1985 to commemorate the women of Burkina 
Faso. Sankara created the Union des femmes Burkina (UFB-Union of Burkina Women) in 
1985. The UFB gave women a political place “within the well-defined bounds of the 
revolution” by allowing them to voice their issues with the men.22 The government 
desired to elevate the status of women beyond the boundaries of previous regimes by 
appointing “five women to ministerial positions” (names not listed) along with promoting 
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the idea of having husbands pay wives half of their salaries.
23 
The Political Orientation 
Discourse (DOP) defined women as equal partners in the revolution. Women no longer 
served men as they were equal partners in an effort to reform government, environment, 
economy, and gender relationships. For the first time in Burkina Faso, national leaders 
considered the importance of women’s issues by attempting to address and inform the 
public about them. 
The battle to maintain a government focused exclusively on self-sufficiency, 
literacy, and meeting basic needs with transparent leadership did not last. Nevertheless, 
the four years and two months of this revolutionary regime was a striking example of 
government accountability to the people never seen in the Upper Volta. Before the 
August coup, political incumbents under previous regimes used their positions to serve 
private interests as opposed to collective civilian needs aside from the regimes 
increasingly autocratic methods toward achieving these goals as 1987 approached. 
Nevertheless, the country in these years (1983-1987) witnessed mass organization, the 
elevation of health, a positive promotion of gender relations, rising education, economic 
frugality (slight growth as a result) and vast small scale development projects. Burkina 
appeared to be on the path to self-sufficiency but not without quarrels as to how the 
revolution must proceed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
23 
Jimmy Kandeh, Coups from Below, 130. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
On 15 October 1987, acting on behalf of groups disenchanted with the direction 
of revolution in the country, Blasé Compaoré, Sankara’s closest friend, and initiator of 
the 4 August coup, launched another coup from the military garrison in Pô that put 
Sankara in power four years earlier. That Thursday afternoon, Sankara was gunned down 
with twelve of his advisors after a short fierce fire-fight. Their bodies were cremated and 
placed in make-shift graves. The leadership, persona and radical nature of the revolution 
in Burkina Faso ended with Sankara’s murder. Three days following this successful 
(third) counter-revolution in Burkina Faso, Compaoré came out of mourning and claimed 
the CNR presidency. In the course of the first four years of his (Compaoré’s) regime, 
Burkina Faso witnessed a brutal end of Sankara’s radical politics. 
What can be learned from the Revolution that took place in Burkina Faso from 
 
1983 to 1987? The revolutionaries found in the political upheavals of the early 1980’s, an 
opportunity to help make a new society out of the old ethnic configurations in the Upper 
Volta. Sankara’s government tried to use the national government as an instrument for 
addressing pressing issues by empowering all civilians to face them head-on. 
Sankara’s regime saw itself as the pioneer of alternative (against foreign 
recommendations) models for development in the Upper Volta. His populist revolution 
aimed to share power between the military and civilian population. In reality, it was a 
segment of the military dictating to society its aspirations of how civility should operate 
politically, socially, economically and, (even) morally. Regarded as a unique form of 
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military-led egalitarianism, this populist revolution attracted civilian support through 
organized mass rallies that praised the government and its (reforming) policies. One can 
conclude that this was a necessary alliance between civilians and the military to 
legitimize a revolutionary agenda aimed at developing a permanent break with the 
political baggage associated with the pre-revolutionary, colonial, and traditional (Mossi) 
structures of power. 
Sankara’s administration initiated agrarian reforms such as fighting deforestation 
with tree planting initiatives and raising grain production through land nationalization 
policy. Thomas Sankara fought government corruption with accountability through the 
creation of his Commission of People for the Prevention of Corruption (CPPC) and the 
Popular Revolutionary Tribunals (TPR). He gave government mobility with constant 
cabinet shuffles, civil servant appointments to rural villages as a means to relate politics 
to ‘real’ people while discouraging politicians from holding longer office terms. He tried 
to make politics in Burkina Faso relevant to all citizens through the formation and 
encouragement of civilian participation in the CDR’s (Committees for the Defense of the 
Revolution). In a way, he tried to expand the role of government by including all civilians 
in the development of political processes.  In the course of four years and two months, the 
revolutionary government touched the lives of many civilians through tree planting 
ceremonies and mass involvement in national decision making through popular tribunals 
( the TPR(s)-Popular Revolutionary Tribunals), and the empowerment of women. 
 
Despite the huge strides made in these three key areas in Burkina Faso: 
administration, environment, and women’s issues. Nevertheless, public dissent gained 
ground. This is partly attributed to the regime’s suppression of anti-revolutionary 
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sentiment among other shortcomings. The goal of these anti-revolutionary forces to end 
the revolution and restore their brand of democracy gained momentum as power slowly 
slipped from Sankara. 
SNEAVH (the National Syndicate for African Teachers of the Upper Volta) was 
perhaps the most outspoken and openly critical of the revolution. Within the first week of 
the August 1983 coup, this teacher’s union, with strong ties to groups outside of Burkina 
Faso (namely Cote d’Ivoire), aimed to achieve two objectives in defiance of the 
revolutionary regime. One, members criticized the new regime’s rise to power in the 
effort to reinforce the need for traditional civilian politicians in national politics. This was 
achieved through petitions to the United Nations (UN), Communauté Economique 
d’Afrique de l’Ouest (CEAO-the English translation is ECOWAS or the Economic 
Community of West African States ), along with other local, regional, or international 
bodies. Two, SNEAVH unionists used protest to avoid cutting union member salaries. 
They considered Sankara’s coup an illegitimate change in the country’s governance and 
publicly denounced and withdrew their support from the revolutionary regime in the fall 
of 1983. 
Within months, groups joined forces with SNEAVH. Lipad (the League for 
 
Patriotic Development) lost favor with the revolution following the group’s failure, in 
 
1984, to convince Sankara appoint more civilian politicians into key offices of national 
government. In Burkina Faso’s revolutionary years, political parties left out of the 
revolutionary government such as SNEAVH and Lipad groups slowly gained control of 
local CNR’s across the country and worked hard to destroy them. It was clear that toward 
the fourth year of the revolution, the military had lost support from a majority of the 
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civilian population. Most civilians may have been disillusioned with the promises made 
by Sankara in the DOP (Revolutionary Political Discourse) speech. The promise of 
power sharing between civilians and the military as the key action of administrative 
reform was not kept when the military decided to appoint their own soldiers to positions 
reserved for civilian revolutionaries such as that of the position of the Secretary General 
of the Consul of the National Revolution. 
Civilians had their choice in trade union leader Soumane Touré for the position 
but the military appointed, contrary to the wishes of civilian parties, a Captain Pierre 
Ouedraogo. SNEAVH and Lipad orchestrated anti-government trade-union protests 
following the revolutionary government’s decision to suspend their participation in 
politics after their alleged ties to coups against the Sankara government. The protests 
were often staged within CDR’s by those forces that managed to infiltrate and take 
charge of them. The anti-revolutionary protests were often repressed and violently by the 
Sankara regime. That undermined Sankara’s popularity with the people. Public outcry 
against these actions also led the CNR to create new political alliances (parties) such as 
the UFB (Union of Burkinabe Women) and the UNAB (National Union of Elders in 
Burkina Faso) to replace groups that were once pro-revolutionary. The Burkinabe 
Revolution came to a sad end upon Sankara’s death on 15 October 1987. 
Nearly thirty years have passed since Sankara’s revolution in Burkina Faso. Yet, 
his legacy speaks louder than ever. His modest tomb bearing the painted revolutionary 
flag remains routinely visited by local villagers. Sankara’s death on October 15, 1987, 
adds to a long list of presidents in “third-world” countries that led revolutions in their 
respective countries with aspirations that survived their assassinations. The revolution in 
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Burkina Faso attempted to reform a post-colonial nation-state. The government’s agrarian 
reforms included land nationalization (lands given to peasant farmers) and a “three- 
struggles” program to eradicate deforestation and drought with nation-wide tree planting 
initiatives. The revolutionary government brought women’s (gender) issues that had 
taken a backseat in the pre-revolutionary period to the fore-front of politics by outlawing 
female circumcision and banning forced marriages and polygamy. 
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